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1 Introduction
Throughout the industrialized world, debt-to-GDP ratios have increased strongly in the after-
math of the global financial crisis, resulting in frequent calls for fiscal austerity measures. An
important issue in this context are the macroeconomic consequences associated with fiscal con-
solidations. While standard Keynesian arguments suggest that fiscal consolidations should be
associated with declines in overall economic activity, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were among
the first to point out that consolidations may give rise to expansionary effects even in the short
run.1
Nevertheless, the idea that fiscal consolidations can exert expansionary effects, remains con-
troversial for at least two reasons: First, empirical evidence is inconclusive. While several
authors report instances of fiscal consolidations that were accompanied by higher GDP growth
(see e.g. Perotti, 1999; van Aarle and Garretsen, 2003; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010, 2013), a num-
ber of studies reaches opposite conclusions (see e.g. Guajardo et al., 2014; Jorda` and Taylor,
2016). Also, from a broader perspective, the literature on fiscal multipliers is similarly am-
biguous and reports a wide range of estimated multipliers (Cogan et al., 2010; Ramey, 2011).
Second, the channels and mechanisms through which a fiscal contraction may generate expan-
sionary effects are not fully understood. Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina et al. (2015)
stress that fiscal contractions can give rise to expansionary supply side effects. The argument
is that adjustments that involve cuts in the government wage bill lead to wage moderation in
the private sector, which in turn stimulates employment and, ultimately, growth. In addition,
cutting back on public debt can reduce sovereign default risk and interest rates, which may then
boost investment and consumption (McDermott and Wescott, 1996).
In this paper, we focus on the so-called expectations channel (Blanchard, 1990; Bertola
and Drazen, 1993; Sutherland, 1997; Ardagna, 2004), through which a fiscal consolidation may
also exert expansionary effects. The intuition goes as follows: If the fiscal position is initially
perceived to be unsustainable, then consumers expect a consolidation to occur in the future and
build up a stock of savings that can be used to compensate the expected decline in disposable
income associated with the consolidation. When the consolidation finally occurs, households
respond with an increase in consumption, resulting in higher aggregate demand. If this channel
is active, then any contractionary effects induced by the consolidation are counteracted and, if
the channel is strong enough, the increase in aggregate demand may translate into expansionary
1They analyzed the effects of fiscal consolidations in Ireland and Denmark where fiscal reforms coincided with
consumption booms during the 1980s.
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effects at the macroeconomic level.
For the expectations channel, forward-looking decision making and the perception of fiscal
policy play a crucial role. The purpose of this paper is to study these aspects in a laboratory
experiment. Specifically, we explore under which circumstances, subjects’ behavior gives rise to
an active expectations channel. Since it is rather challenging to identify the effects of forward-
looking behavior in macroeconomic data, a laboratory setting is a promising environment. In
addition, the experimental method allows us to isolate the expectation channel and abstract
from other factors that may determine the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy.2
In our experimental design, subjects make repeated consumption and savings decisions tak-
ing into account current and future fiscal policy. Since the fiscal position before and after a
consolidation plays a crucial role for the expectations channel, we vary the extent to which the
fiscal stance prevailing at the start of the experiment is sustainable across treatments. We also
vary the type as well as the amount of information available to the subjects across treatments,
to study how subjects process information about fiscal positions.
We find that initial fiscal conditions do matter in the sense that consumption declines less
in response to a consolidation if the initial position is unsustainable. In other words, fiscal
consolidations that occur in an unsustainable fiscal environment exert less contractionary effects
on consumption, which is in line with the expectations channel. Nevertheless, we also find that
subjects exhibit strong tendencies to maintain a stock of savings after the consolidation. We
obtain this result despite the fact that the consolidation is credible in the sense that further tax
increases are not necessary.
We conclude that although precautionary behavior is required to build up a sufficiently large
saving stock before the consolidation, by the same virtue, subjects refrain from consumption
after the contraction, even if the consolidation leads to a sustainable fiscal position. We obtain
stronger effects if the fiscal authority can convincingly commit to abstain from tax increases in
the future. Thus, while the existing literature emphasizes that consolidations have to be credible
in the sense of leading to a sustainable fiscal position (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Bergman
and Hutchison, 2010), our findings show that this may not be sufficient for a quantitatively more
pronounced expectations channel. We also find that increasing subjects’ level of awareness of
the sustainable nature of the fiscal position by running a transparent policy has only little
influence on the outcomes.
2E.g. the level of economic development, the exchange rate regime, openness (see e.g. Ilzetzki et al., 2013),
monetary policy (see e.g. Bi et al., 2013), credit market conditions (see e.g. Auerbach et al., 2010), or the level
of public debt (see e.g. Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Bi et al., 2013).
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The paper is related to several strands of the experimental literature. The bulk of the
experimental literature on fiscal policy in a macroeconomic context evaluates the Ricardian
equivalence proposition (Cadsby and Frank, 1991; Slate et al., 1995; Ricciuti and Di Laurea,
2003; Adji et al., 2009; Meissner and Afschar, 2014, among others).3 While Ricardian equiva-
lence is also based on the assumption that agents take future fiscal policy into account when
making consumption decisions, our paper differs from these contributions in terms of our fo-
cus on fiscal contractions and in terms of the experimental design.4 A large strand of the
experimental literature explores the formation of expectations (see e.g. Hommes, 2011) and
Bernasconi et al. (2009) study expectation formation in the context of fiscal policy. They show
that subjects have only a limited ability to forecast and interpret real world fiscal data, but do
not analyze potential implications for consumption behavior, which is the focus of our analysis.
Although our analysis is about fiscal policy, the paper is also related to Kryvtsov and Petersen
(2013), who investigate expectation effects in the context of monetary policy.5 In terms of the
experimental design, our setting shares some similarities with experimental work on dynamic
consumption and saving behavior (see, for instance Hey and Dardanoni, 1988; Noussair and
Matheny, 2000; Lei and Noussair, 2002; Ballinger et al., 2003; Carbone and Hey, 2004; Brown
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in our design, we abstract from a number of complications, which
typically arise in intertemporal choice experiments,6 to focus on the crucial elements of the
expectations channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we formulate our research
questions and Section 3 introduces the experimental design and our hypotheses. In Section 4
we discuss the implemented treatments and Section 5 provides information about procedure.
In Section 6, we present our results and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Research Questions
The expectations channel holds that unsustainable fiscal positions prior to a consolidation play
a crucial role. This point is emphasized by Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), and
3See Duffy (2012) for surveys of the experimental macroeconomics in general.
4In fact, as we will discuss below, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our setting.
5A large empirical literature studies the effects of central bank communication and forward guidance and
expected policy in the context of monetary policy (see e.g. Neuenkirch, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012). See Leeper
(2009) for a discussion of the similarities between fiscal and monetary policy with respect to transparency and
anchoring of expectations.
6E.g. the complexity of the decision problem (Noussair and Matheny, 2000), the critical role of experience
(Ballinger et al., 2003), and the limited ability of subjects to deal with long planing horizons and stochastic
processes (Carbone and Hey, 2004).
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Sutherland (1997) among others. Thus, we formulate our first research question (RQ1) as:
Are fiscal contractions less contractionary (or more expansionary) if initial fiscal positions are
unsustainable?
The expectations channel also holds that a fiscal consolidation should be less contractionary
if it eliminates the expectation of future, perhaps more disruptive, adjustments (see McDer-
mott and Wescott, 1996; Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Bergman and
Hutchison, 2010), which leads us to our second research question (RQ2): Are fiscal contractions
less contractionary if subjects can be certain that there will not be additional tax hikes?
And finally, we study the role of awareness about fiscal policy more generally. We formulate
our third research question (RQ3) as: Are fiscal contractions less contractionary if subjects
are more aware of the unsustainable (sustainable) nature of fiscal policy before (after) a fiscal
consolidation?
3 Experimental Design
Rather than implementing a specific theoretical model, our design is geared towards studying
the conditions under which the expectation channel is active in a simple and easy to explain
set-up. We use a between subject, individual choice design without any interactions between
subjects.
Each treatment comprises of t = 1, . . . , 12 periods. In each period, subjects receive an
income, yt, of 18 consumption goods. A tax, taxt, is subtracted from yt, and the net income
yt− taxt can either be consumed or saved, where savings can be used for consumption in future
periods. Thus, subjects face the following constraint in each period:
cit + sit = yt − taxt + sit−1, (1)
where cit ≥ 0 is consumption in period t and sit ≥ 0 denotes the stock of saving in period
t. Note that subjects do not earn interest on savings and are not able to borrow. Introducing
interest income and the opportunity to borrow against future income might complicate the task.
Also note that since subjects essentially face a credit constraint, Ricardian equivalence does not
hold in this setting.7
In all treatments subjects are instructed that an exogenously imposed solvency requirement
7To explore the robustness of our results we also conducted treatments where we allow subjects to borrow
(see Section 6.4 below).
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for the government has to be met: total tax revenues collected from each subject over the course
of the experiment amount to 72 units:
12∑
t=1
taxt = 72. (2)
Subjects are also explicitly instructed in all treatments that an average tax of 6 units per period
is necessary to satisfy the government’s solvency condition and that deviations from a tax of 6
units in any period have to be compensated over the course of the treatment.
Consumption in period t yields a period payoff according to
Payoff it =

0 if cit < 9
cit if cit ≥ 9
. (3)





is maximized, where β1,...,12 = 1.00, 0.98, 0.96, . . . , 0.78 are the period-specific discount factors.
At the end of the experiment, we deduct 10 percent of a subjects’ total payoff for each period
where consumption was below the threshold of 9 units, in addition to a period payoff of 0
in these periods. We impose the threshold level in the payoff function and this penalty to
provide incentives to accumulate savings in a way which is easy to explain in the instructions.
This formulation of the task allows us to study intertemporal decision making in a simple
environment that avoids complications associated with intertemporal optimization which arise
in more general settings. Yet, we are able to study the crucial elements of the expectations
channel. Subjects face a tradeoff between early consumption, incentivized via discounting, and
saving to avoid falling below the threshold in case of high values of taxt in future periods.
Note that without discounting, subjects would have a clear incentive to postpone consumption
above the threshold until the last period, essentially eliminating the possibility to observe a
consumption boom in early periods.
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4 Treatments and Hypotheses
We implement four treatments varying either the initial tax level, to evaluate the role of initial
conditions, or the information available to the subjects. In all treatments, subjects are instructed
on their constant gross income, the total amount of tax payments, and the corresponding average
per period tax. In each treatment, a tax increase of 6 units of the consumption good occurs
in period t = 5. While we focus on treatments where subjects cannot accumulate debt, all
treatments are repeated with the opportunity to use credits. We discuss these treatments
separately in the results section (Section 6.4). Our hypotheses also apply to the debt versions
of the treatments.
Treatment UNSUST In this treatment, taxt = 2 in periods t = 1, ..., 4. Thus, fiscal con-
ditions are initially inconsistent with the constraint that total revenues have to amount to 72
units, and therefore unsustainable. A one-time, permanent tax increase to taxt = 8 in period
t = 5 eliminates the unsustainability. The tax path is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Treatment SUST This treatment replicates Treatment UNSUST, but with a tax path that
is already sustainable from the beginning. The tax path is shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1.
Although it is not necessary in terms of sustainability, the tax increases in period t = 5 and, to
ensure that total tax revenues sum to 72 tokes, the tax increase is followed by a permanent tax
reduction in period t = 7.
Treatment COMMIT In this treatment we use the tax path from Treatment UNSUST,
but at the time of the consolidation in period t = 5, the entire future tax path (for periods
t = 5, ..., 12) is announced and therefore any uncertainty about future fiscal policy is eliminated.
Treatment TRANSP Here, the tax follows again the path from Treatment UNSUST and
subjects have essentially the same information as in Treatment UNSUST, but we provide addi-
tional interpretations in the form of statements that are displayed on the screen stating explicitly
that the current tax level is either not sufficient (in periods t = 1, ..., 4) or that the tax is suf-
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ficient (in periods t = 5, ..., 12).8 The statements which are intended to raise awareness are
shown in Table 1.9
[Insert Table 1 about here]
A less contractionary effect should be the result of a combination of high savings before
the consolidation and a reduction in savings during or shortly after the consolidation. Since
unsustainable fiscal positions should provide a stronger incentive to build up a stock of savings,
we expect less contractionary effects of the adjustment on consumption in UNSUST compared
to SUST. Thus, we formulate Hypothesis 1: The change of consumption from period t = 5 to
period t = 4, ci5 − ci4, should be less contractionary in UNSUST than in SUST.
In Treatment COMMIT,10 we eliminate any uncertainty about the future tax path at the
time of the consolidation, and therefore subjects have essentially no reason to maintain a stock
of savings after the adjustment sets in. In fact, due to discounting they have a strong incentive
to immediately consume their accumulated savings. Thus, Hypothesis 2: We expect ci5− ci4 to
be larger in COMMIT than in UNSUST.
While the additional statements introduced in Treatment TRANSP do not provide new
information, they may influence the perception of fiscal sustainability before and after the
consolidation and therefore, influence behavior.
Thus, we expect higher savings prior to the consolidation and a stronger reduction of the
savings stock after the contraction compared to the Treatment UNSUST and we formulate
Hypothesis 3 as: ci5 − ci4 should be larger in TRANSP than in UNSUST.11
8This treatment might be considered as an attempt to ‘nudge’ subjects towards precautionary savings. Nudg-
ing as a form of liberal paternalism intends to alter people’s behavior without restricting the choice set or incentive
structure (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2009). Nudging towards higher savings rates involves techniques to over-
come deficiencies in self control and myopicity (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), to exploit heuristics in designing
savings plans (e.g. Benartzi and Thaler, 2007), or to use subtle cues to the benefits of savings (Choi et al., 2012).
The approach in TRANSP is slightly different. We use verbal interpretations of the existing (and commonly
known) situation to increase the subjects’ awareness. While this is related to the approach in Choi et al. (2012)
our information regards the fiscal situation, not the effects of savings itself.
9The statements are neutrally phrased interpretations of the current fiscal situation. We vary the formulation
of the sentences slightly to make it more likely that subjects pay attention to the messages.
10Since we announce the future tax path in this treatment, the analysis shares some similarities with exper-
imental studies of central bank communication and forward guidance (see e.g. Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2013;
Petersen and Arifovic, 2015).
11We do not have an unambiguous hypothesis concerning the relative effects in TRANSP and COMMIT. While
the absence of uncertainty after the consolidation should reduce savings in the aftermath of the consolidation,
and hence give rise to larger effect on consumption, in COMMIT, subjects may build up a larger stock of savings
in TRANSP giving rise to a larger effect in TRANSP.
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5 Procedure
The experiments were conducted computerized, using z–Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), at the Uni-
versity of Innsbruck. We had 40 participants in each treatment. Participants were mostly
undergraduate students from various faculties. No subject participated more than once. Upon
arrival participants were randomly assigned to workstations that were separated by blinds. In-
structions were distributed and read aloud, and participants were given a few more minutes to
go through the instructions and to ask questions.12
Prior to the actual start of the experiment, subjects went through two practice rounds to
acquaint themselves with the operation of the program. Subjects were told that they have
30 seconds time for their decision in each period. We implement an open time limit in the
sense that the experiment proceeds to the next period only after all subjects have entered and
confirmed their consumption choice. Any remaining wealth was automatically saved for future
periods. We displayed the relevant information for the task on the decision screen: endowment,
the current tax, the resulting net income, the stock of savings, and the wealth.
Since the expectations channel relies on the perception of future fiscal policy, we elicited
beliefs on future net income in all treatments with the exception of COMMIT. In COMMIT
we refrained from elicitation, since we worried about confusing subjects by asking them to
state beliefs in an environment without any uncertainty. We elicited beliefs in the following
way: at the end of each period, subjects were asked whether they expected their net-income, in
subsequent rounds on average to be higher, approximately the same (+/− one unit), or lower
compared to the current period. To incentivize the elicitation, subjects received one additional
payoff point on top of their total payoff for each correct forecast.
The duration of the experiments varied from 35 to 50 minutes – depending on the treatment.
Total payoffs were converted to euros using a rate of 1.00 euro per 15 payoff points. The
determinants of the reimbursement were common knowledge. On average, in Treatment SUST,
UNSUST, COMMIT and TRANSP subjects earned EUR 13.44 euros including a 4 euro show-up
fee (min: 5.70 euros, max: 15.10 euros).
12See Appendix A for the instructions.
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6 Results
6.1 Measuring the Consumption Response
Figure 2 shows consumption, averaged across subjects, for each treatment, together with net
income represented by the light-gray lines. Although the tax increases by the same amount
in all treatments in period t = 5, the average response of consumption differs markedly across
treatments. In Treatments SUST, UNSUST, and TRANSP, consumption declines, with less
pronounced reactions in Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP. In Treatment COMMIT, aver-
age consumption increases. Also note that the decline in consumption is rather temporary in
Treatment SUST, which is consistent with the subsequent tax reduction that occurs only in this
treatment in period t = 7, whereas consumption recovers rather slowly in Treatments UNSUST
and TRANSP.13
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
To study the consumption responses in greater detail, Table 2 shows the average consumption
response to the consolidation, calculated as the change in consumption from period t = 4 to
period t = 5, ci5 − ci4, averaged across subjects in each treatment.14 We see that average
consumption declines significantly by 8.43 units in Treatment SUST. In Treatments UNSUST
and TRANSP, the average declines in consumption of 3.36 units and 3.17 units, respectively,
are substantially less pronounced, albeit still significant. In Treatment COMMIT, consumption
significantly increases by 5.49 units on average.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 also reports pairwise Mann Wittney rank sum tests in the lower panel, which indicate
that consumption declines significantly more in Treatment SUST than in Treatment UNSUST.
This ordering of the effects confirms Hypothesis 1 and with respect to RQ1, we conclude that
consolidations occurring under an unsustainable initial fiscal position exert significantly less
contractionary effects on consumption.
Note that since the tax increases by the same amount in all treatment, which facilitates
comparability across treatments, net income in Treatment SUST falls below the consumption
13In Figure B.1 in Appendix B we show average consumption paths together with the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and the 90th percentile of the distribution of consumption choices to provide a more detailed description of
subjects’ choices.
14Considering only the immediate consumption response in the period, in which the consolidation occurs, does
not appear to be restrictive, since Figure 2 shows that the responses generally occur rapidly. Hence, we are not
excluding any potentially delayed effects in the analysis.
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threshold, whereas it remains above the threshold in treatments with unsustainable tax paths.
Therefore, it appears conceivable that consumption choices vis-a`-vis the contraction are biased
downwards in Treatment SUST since subjects receive no period payoff for consumption below
the threshold. While this may impair the comparison of the exact magnitudes in Treatments
SUST and UNSUST, the ordering of effects should not be affected. Nevertheless, to see whether
average consumption in SUST is indeed influenced by the parameterization of the threshold, we
repeated Treatments SUST and UNSUST with a lower consumption threshold of 5 units of the
consumption good (instead of 9 units in the payoff function in (3) in the baseline treatments).15
Figure B.2 in Appendix B shows average consumption outcomes for Treatments SUST and UN-
SUST for the two different threshold values. We see that consumption choices are essentially
not influenced by the parameterization of the threshold. With the lower threshold, average con-
sumption drops by 5.67 units in response to the consolidation in Treatment SUST, and by 4.05
units in Treatment UNSUST. As in the baseline treatments, these declines differ significantly
from each other according to the Mann Wittney rank sum test (p-value: 0.03).
To address RQ2 concerning the role of commitment, we compare outcomes in Treatments
UNSUST and COMMIT. Both treatments share an initially unsustainable tax level, but differ
with respect to the provided information. According to Table 2, the null hypothesis of equal
consumption responses in Treatments UNSUST and COMMIT can be rejected at the one per-
cent level. In other words, we cannot reject Hypothesis 2. Hence, we conclude that commitment
renders the consolidation effect on consumption significantly less contractionary.
Turning to RQ3, we compare outcomes in Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP. Do we need
a fully credible commitment to obtain a less contractionary outcome, or does an increased level
of awareness about the overall fiscal position suffice? Although the consumption response in
Treatment TRANSP is slightly less pronounced than in Treatment UNSUST, as expected, the
difference is not statistically significant. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 3 and conclude that a more
transparent policy is not sufficient to significantly alter the effect of a fiscal consolidation in an
unsustainable environment.
In short, we conclude that the effect of a fiscal consolidation on consumption depends cru-
cially on the initial conditions and on the ability of the fiscal authority to credibly commit to
a tax path after the consolidation. While the existing literature emphasizes that a contraction
has to be credible in the sense that it leads a sustainable fiscal position, our results suggest
15For the treatments with the lower consumption threshold we had 80 participants, 40 in SUST and 40 in
UNSUST.
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that this may not be enough to stimulate consumption sufficiently after a consolidation. At
least for strongly less contractionary outcomes, or even an expansionary effect on consumption,
a credible commitment is required.
As a next step of our analysis, and to introduce an additional perspective on our results,
we compare the path for average consumption to a specific reference path in Figure 3. This
reference path is the path we would obtain if subjects followed a simple rule according to which
they consume the average net income and save the remainder if net income is above average.
If subjects follow this rule, then the consumption path should be flat at a level of 12 units of
the consumption good in all treatments. The intuition behind this rule is that whenever taxt is
below 6 (the average per period tax level which is required to meet the solvency requirement),
subjects consume 18 (endowment) - 6 (sustainable tax) = 12 units and save the remainder to be
prepared for future tax increases. Thus, in the run up to the fiscal contraction, the rule takes
the sustainability of the initial fiscal position into account.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
For easy reference, Figure 3 also shows the actual, average consumption paths as well as the
net income from Figure 2. The reference path is represented by the bold dashed line. Looking
at Treatment SUST, average consumption appears to be relatively close to the reference path in
early periods, indicating that subjects take the sustainable nature of the tax path into account
and do not really anticipate a contraction. In the treatments with the initially unsustainable
tax, the actual, average consumption path generally lies between the current net income and
the reference path, but somewhat closer to the reference path. Thus, the simple behavioral rule
according to which subjects consume average net income has some merit as a description of
subjects’ behavior in our experiment.
Having characterized consolidation effects on the aggregate level, Figure 4 summarizes the
distribution of consumption responses to provide a more detailed description of individual con-
sumption choices. The vertical line indicates the average contraction response which is also
shown in Table 2. In Treatment SUST, none of the subjects increases consumption due the
tax increase. While the distribution shifts somewhat to the right in Treatments UNSUST and
TRANSP, it is still roughly only 20 percent of the subjects that increase consumption in response
to the consolidation in these two treatments. In Treatment COMMIT, in contrast, around 80
percent increase consumption. Using pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, we can reject the null
hypothesis that consumption responses are drawn from the same distribution at the one percent
12
level for all cases except for the comparison of outcomes in Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP
(p-value: 0.91). Thus, this analysis at the level of individual subjects confirms our previously
reported results.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
6.2 Savings Behavior
For the expectations channel to be active, subjects need to accumulate savings before the
consolidation and have to reduce their savings once the consolidation sets in. Therefore, to
shed more light on the source of the observed variation in the consumption response across
treatments, we study savings behavior before and after the consolidation.
Table 3 shows average savings rates before and after the consolidation for each treatment.
We calculate the savings rate for each subject as sit/(yt − taxt) and average over the subjects
participating in a treatment. To characterize savings behavior before and after the consoli-
dation, we average over either 4 periods before the consolidation, or 4 periods following the
consolidation, including the consolidation period itself. We limit the analysis of savings rates
in the aftermath of the consolidation to four periods following the consolidation to make sure
that we do not pick up end-of-experiment effects. In Treatment SUST, the contraction is fol-
lowed by a tax reduction, which complicates a comparison of outcomes in the post-consolidation
sample. Therefore we do not calculate the average savings rate for Treatment SUST after the
contraction.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We see that subjects save on average 5 percent of their net income before the consolidation
in Treatment SUST. In treatments with unsustainable tax paths, we observe savings rates of 16
percent (Treatment TRANSP) and 18 percent (Treatments UNSUST and COMMIT). Pairwise
Mann-Whitney rank sum tests indicate that the savings rate in Treatment SUST is significantly
lower than in any of the other treatments. Hence, in an environment with sustainable initial
conditions, subjects accumulate a significantly smaller stock of savings, which limits their ability
to sustain consumption when the tax is increased. This finding supports the expectations
channel and is consistent with the significantly more contractionary effect of the consolidation
on consumption in Treatment SUST.
However, above we also find that consumption responses differ significantly across Treat-
ments with initially unsustainable tax paths (Treatments UNSUST, TRANSP, and COMMIT),
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while Table 3 shows that savings rates prior to the consolidation, do not differ significantly
across these treatments. Thus, differences in savings rates before the consolidation only explain
the variation in the consolidation effect between treatments with sustainable and unsustain-
able tax paths, but do not tell us why the consolidation effect also differs strongly within the
treatments with unsustainable tax paths.
Turning to savings behavior in the post-consolidation periods, we observe negative savings
rates in Treatments UNSUST, TRANSP, and COMMIT. Thus, subjects use accumulated sav-
ings to sustain consumption after the fiscal consolidation to some extent. However, savings rates
are only slightly, and in fact insignificantly, negative in Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP,
indicating that subjects essentially rely on their current net incomes to support consumption
and reduce their accumulated stock of savings only gradually in these treatments. In Treatment
COMMIT the post-consolidation savings rate is strongly and significantly negative. Thus, in
Treatment COMMIT, subjects strongly consume out of their accumulated savings once the tax is
increased. In addition, pairwise Mann-Whitney tests indicate that although post-consolidation
savings rates in Treatment COMMIT differ significantly from the savings rates in Treatments
UNSUST and TRANSP, the null hypothesis that savings rates are equal in Treatments UNSUST
and TRANSP is not rejected.
In short, differences in savings behavior before, as well as after the consolidation, contribute
to the variation in the consolidation effect discussed above. If initial conditions are unsustain-
able, subjects generally realize that taxes have to increase in the future and build up a stock
of savings, which makes the tax increase less contractionary. However, even if the tax increase
renders the fiscal position sustainable, subjects are still reluctant to consume their accumulated
savings stock, as long as additional tax increases in the future are not explicitly ruled out.
To illustrate the dynamics of savings in more detail, Figure 5 shows the evolution of average
savings rates in Treatments UNSUST, TRANSP, and COMMIT over time. In Treatment SUST,
the average savings rate quickly falls during the initial periods, whereas it remains fairly constant
in the treatments with an initially unsustainable tax path. In t = 4, the last period before the
contraction, the average savings rate is even slightly negative in Treatment SUST. After the
contraction, the savings rate increases briefly in Treatment SUST, which mirrors the strong
decline in consumption in this treatment.16 In Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP average
savings rates start to decline after the contraction, but only slowly. In Treatment COMMIT,
16Since net income drops below the minimum consumption level, subjects have a strong incentive to cut back
on consumption.
14
the average savings rate declines quickly and strongly when the consolidation occurs.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
6.3 Elicited Beliefs
According to the expectations channel, variation in consumption responses and savings rates
across treatments should be ultimately due to differences in subjects’ elicited beliefs. In this
section, we explore whether this is the case.
As a first step of the analysis, we check whether the elicitation of beliefs influences outcomes.
Possibly, the elicitation procedure alters the subject’s awareness for the nature of the fiscal path
which in turn might affect consumption decisions. To do so, we repeated Treatment UNSUST
without elicitation with the same number of subjects and compare the distribution of average
consumption for each period across treatments. According to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that average consumption levels in the two treatments are
drawn from the same distribution (p-value: 0.99). Thus, we conclude the elicitation of beliefs
itself does not influence subjects’ behavior.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the distributions of elicited beliefs for each period and for Treat-
ments SUST, UNSUST, and TRANSP, respectively. In each figure, starting from the left, the
dark-grey bars show the fraction of subjects who believe that net income will decrease. The
adjacent light-grey bars show the fraction of subjects who believe that net income remains
roughly constant. And finally, the medium-grey bar on the right gives the fraction of subjects
who believe that net income will decrease.
[Insert Figures 6, 7, and 8 about here]
We see from Figure 6 that the majority of subjects initially expect a roughly constant level
of net income in Treatment SUST, which is consistent with the sustainable tax path. In period
t = 5, when the tax increase occurs, subjects start to correctly expect a tax decrease and on
average a higher net income for the remainder of the treatment.
For Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP with initially unsustainable tax paths, Figures 7
and 8 show that the majority of subjects correctly expect that taxes will be raised in the future,
resulting in a lower expected net income. Interestingly, however, we also see that this fraction
starts to decline somewhat from period t = 2 onwards in Treatment UNSUST, whereas it
remains relatively stable in Treatment TRANSP, which indicates that the additional messages
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provided in Treatment TRANSP help subjects to correctly interpret the environment. Similarly,
after the tax increase, subjects adjust their beliefs substantially faster in Treatment TRANSP
as the share of subject who expect net income to remain constant drops immediately from 60
percent in period t = 4 to below 20 percent in period t = 5. In Treatment, UNSUST, this share
also drops by roughly the same magnitude, but the adjustment of beliefs is substantially more
gradual and lasts until period t = 8. Which illustrates again, that the displayed messages in
the TRANSP Treatment play some role for the formation of beliefs.
To see how the variation in beliefs corresponds to the treatment variation of the consumption
response, we focus on the fraction of subjects indicating that net income will decrease on average
over the course of the experiment in the remainder of the analysis. We concentrate on this
fraction since it should be primarily the subjects expecting a tax increase who build up a
savings stock prior to the consolidation. And, a credible consolidation should convince subjects
that taxes will not increase again.
To compare beliefs before and after the consolidation, we average these fractions over four
periods before the consolidation and over four periods after the consolidation for Treatments
SUST, UNSUST, and TRANSP. Recall that we do not elicit beliefs in Treatment COMMIT.
Also, we refrain from interpreting beliefs in Treatment SUST in the aftermath of the consolida-
tion, due to the limited comparability as a result of different paths for net income.
Table 4 shows that 14 percent of the subjects participating in Treatment SUST expect lower
future net income before the consolidation. In Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP, this fraction
is substantially, and also significantly, higher at 68 percent. Thus, if tax path is sustainable,
subjects worry less about future tax hikes, which is consistent with the significantly lower
average savings rate prior to the consolidation in Treatment SUST, and ultimately, a strong
decline in consumption once the tax is increased. For Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP,
the null hypothesis of equal fractions of subjects expecting a tax increase cannot be rejected,
which is in line with the fairly similar savings rates observed prior to the consolidation in these
treatments.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
After the consolidation, the fraction of subjects with the belief that net income will decline
further, falls to 28 percent in Treatments UNSUST and to 14 percent in Treatment TRANSP.
While the decline is highly significant in both treatments, the magnitude is larger in Treatment
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TRANSP.17 In addition, Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis of equal fractions in Treatment
UNSUST and TRANSP after the consolidation can be rejected at the 5 percent level.
Although the stronger effect of the consolidation on subjects’ beliefs in Treatment TRANSP
is in line with our expectation, savings rates, as discussed above, do not differ significantly across
Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP. Hence, although the additional announcements provided
in Treatment TRANSP appear to convince subjects that additional tax increases will not occur,
they are insufficient to induce subjects to adjust their consumption choices accordingly. Table 5
presents Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between beliefs in the contraction period and
changes in consumption due to the contraction for Treatments SUST, UNSUST and TRANSP.
While we observe a weakly significant and positive correlation in Treatment SUST, the corre-
lation coefficients are insignificant in Treatments UNSUST and TRANSP, where subjects tend
to worry more about additional future tax hikes. These results are consistent with Armantier
et al. (2015) who find that people do not always act on their beliefs, and underlines again the
crucial role of commitment in our setting.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
6.4 Allowing for Debt Accumulation
In the treatments discussed so far, subjects did not have the opportunity to borrow. While
avoiding debt accumulation helps to keep the environment simple and minimizes the potential
for confusion, it is conceivable that the opportunity to borrow influences savings behavior and
therefore also changes the effects of the consolidation. To explore this issue, we generated 40
additional observations for each of the Treatments SUST, UNSUST, TANSP, and COMMIT
and allowed subjects to borrow. In other words, the savings account balance sit−1 is no longer
required to be positive. We refer to these new treatments as SUST-DEBT, UNSUST-DEBT,
TRANSP-DEBT, and COMMIT-DEBT. Apart from subjects’ ability to acquire debt, the gen-
eral design and the parameterization are identical to the respective baseline treatments. While
subjects do still not earn interest on positive savings, as discussed in Section 3, they are charged
a rate of 2 percent per period if sit−1 < 0.18
Although consumption can exceed disposable income and accumulated savings in these
treatments in a given period, we are able to ensure that subjects can fully repay their debt
17Based on Mann-Whitney ranksum-tests, the null hypothesis of equal fractions before and after the consoli-
dation within treatments can be rejected at the one percent level for both treatments.
18Recall that for discounting future payoffs, we use a weight β ≤ 1 which is linearly decreasing at a rate of 0.02
each period. The 2 percent interest rate is close to this discount rate.
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by the end of the experiment by constraining consumption choices in the following way:
cit ≤ cmaxit =
12∑
τ=t






sit−1 if sit−1 ≥ 0
1.02sit−1 if sit−1 < 0
. (6)
Thus, in any given period, consumption cannot exceed the sum of the present value of net
incomes over the remaining periods of the experiment plus the savings account balance at the
beginning of period t, bit. In the DEBT treatments, we show c
max
it on the decision screen in
addition to the information also shown in the baseline treatments without debt accumulation
(that is, gross income, tax, net income, and account balance). Note that information about
the interest rate and total net income are known to subjects. Hence, showing cmaxit does not
provide any additional information in the DEBT treatments. The procedure was analogous to
our baseline treatments. On average subjects earned, including the show-up fee, 12.25 euros in
the DEBT treatments (min: 6.70 euros, max: 15.10 euros).
Figure 9 shows per period consumption, averaged across subjects, for the DEBT treatments
(bold black), and for the baseline treatments without debt (dots). The light grey line represents
net income. We see that average consumption in the DEBT treatments generally exceeds
average consumption in the respective baseline treatments without debt in the first and second
period. Thus, subjects tend to borrow mainly in early periods.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
Table 6 shows the change in consumption in the contraction period, ci5 − ci4, averaged
across subjects. In general, differences across the DEBT treatments are less pronounced and
less significant than in the baseline treatments, which mirrors the stronger variation in the data
due to the somewhat more complex environment. Nevertheless, we see from the top panel of the
table, where consumption is averaged over all subjects participating in a certain treatment, that
the ordering of the consumption responses is the same as in the baseline treatments without debt.
We observe the strongest consumption decline in Treatment SUST-DEBT (3.96 units), whereas
drops are less pronounced in UNSUST-DEBT (2.53 units) and TRANSP-DEBT (3.64 units).
We observe the most muted reaction in Treatment COMMIT-DEBT. Overall, we conclude that
although introducing debt influences subjects’ behavior, as expected, our main results remain
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robust.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The accumulation of debt in early periods may already severely limit choices at the time of
the consolidation due to constraint (5). To see how indebtedness at the time of the consolidation
influences the results, we report average consumption responses separately for subjects with a
non-negative level of savings at the beginning of period t = 5 in the middle panel of Table
6, and for subjects with negative savings at the beginning of period t = 5 in the bottom
panel of the table. We see that when we consider only subjects with non-negative savings,
the results resemble closely those obtained in the baseline treatments. The results reported in
the bottom panel shows that consumption generally declines stronger when we only consider
subjects who have negative savings at the time of the consolidation. Thus, subjects who have
already accumulated debt prior to the consolidation appear to be less able to maintain a certain
consumption level when net income declines.
Table 7 shows pre- and post-contraction savings rates observed in the DEBT treatments. The
top panel shows savings rates for all subjects, the middle panel shows savings rates for subjects
with non-negative savings account at the beginning of period t = 5, and the bottom panel
presents savings rates for subjects with negative savings account at the time of the consolidation.
We see from the top panel of the table that savings rates are negative on average before the
consolidation, which shows again that some subjects acquire substantial amounts of debt in early
periods. Also note that average savings rates are positive in the aftermath of the consolidation
as subjects are required to repay their debts.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
From the middle panel of the table, we see that for subjects with non-negative savings
at the time of the consolidation, savings rates are remarkably similar to those observed in
the treatments without debt. During pre-contraction periods, this subset of subjects saves on
average only a fraction of 7 percent in Treatment SUST-DEBT, but 15 percent in Treatment
UNSUST-DEBT and 17 percent in both, Treatment TRANSP-DEBT and COMMIT-DEBT.
These results again suggest that the initially sustainable tax path results in lower savings. For
periods 5 to 8, we see that average savings rates are negative, which is also in line with the
outcomes in the baseline treatments. The bottom panel of the table shows that for subjects
who are already indebted at the time of the consolidation, average savings rates turn positive
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in the aftermath of the consolidation. This outcome illustrates again that these subjects are
primarily concerned with repaying their debts.
Interestingly, although subjects borrow in early periods in the DEBT treatments, as dis-
cussed above, they are rather reluctant to borrow in order to smooth the effect of the consolida-
tion on net income. In Treatments UNSUST-DEBT, TRANSP-DEBT, and COMMIT-DEBT
only 2 subjects accumulate new debt in period t = 5. In Treatment SUST-DEBT, this num-
ber is higher (24 subjects), since net income drops below the consumption threshold in this
Treatment and therefore subjects have a strong incentive to borrow and consume at least the
threshold level. Thus, although consumption choices at the time of the consolidation are lim-
ited for subjects who have already acquired debt in early periods, subjects also appear to be
generally reluctant to borrow in order to sustain consumption. This result is consistent with
the interpretation that subjects exhibit debt aversion (see e.g. Meissner, 2015).
7 Concluding Remarks
According to the expectations channel, fiscal consolidations may give rise to expansionary effects
on consumption at the macroeconomic level if people build up a sufficient stock of savings
before the consolidation, since they realize that a fiscal consolidation has to occur. When the
consolidation finally occurs, and eliminates the need for further savings, a consumption boom
should follow.
While our results provide support for the expectations channel in the sense that consoli-
dations occurring in an unsustainable fiscal environment are less contractionary, we also find
that the remaining uncertainty in the aftermath of a consolidation plays a crucial role. In our
experimental setting, subjects are generally reluctant to reduce savings sufficiently after the
consolidation occurs, even if the fiscal situation becomes sustainable. We obtain substantially
stronger effects in line with the expectations channel if the fiscal authority can credibly commit
to refrain from additional tax hikes in the future, thereby eliminating any uncertainty in the
aftermath of a consolidation.
While we do not want to overextend the external validity of our results, given the stylized
nature of laboratory experiments, the analysis shows a rather cautious picture of the circum-
stances under which fiscal consolidations may turn out to have expansionary macroeconomic
effects through the expectations channel. To obtain a quantitatively strong expectations chan-
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A Instructions for Treatments SUST, UNSUST, and COM-
MIT19
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not speak to other participants and use only applications
on the computer that are required for the experiment. Please remove all personal items from
your desk and switch off your mobile phone and similar electronic devices. Please note that
activities which are not related to the experiment such as playing computer games, surfing on the
internet or reading non-experiment related material leads to an expulsion from the experiment.
In this case you do not receive a payout. Thank you for your understanding.
The goal of this experiment is to study decision-making behavior. You can earn real money.
Your payout depends only on your decisions according to the rules of the experiment explained
in the instructions at hand. Data from the experiment is anonymized and cannot be traced back
to participants. Neither the other participants nor the experimenters know which decisions you
have taken and how much you have earned.
Overview
This experiment is about fictitious consumption and savings decisions. Specifically, you decide
on how much of your (fictitious) income after taxes you want to spend on current consumption
and how much you want to save. Savings may be used in succeeding periods.
Income
Each period you receive a gross income of 18 tokens. From this gross income each period a
tax is subtracted.
Your net income, in this case 18 tokens less taxes, can be either used for consumption
purposes or saved and spent in later periods.
Please note that taxes, and hence, net income, may vary from period to period.
The maximum amount of tokens you can spend on consumption goods equals the sum of
your net income plus total savings from previous periods. The amount which is not spend on
consumption will automatically be saved and can be consumed in later periods.
Please note that you do not earn interest on savings. Hence, if you save e.g. 2 tokens in
period 4, then you may use exactly these 2 tokens for consumption purposes in later periods.
19Instructions are translated from German. The instructions are almost identical for Treatment TRANSP. We
just additionally mention that there are messages on the current tax.
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The experiment lasts for 12 periods. Savings which are leftover after period 12 are
FORFEITED and do not contribute to your payout!
Consumption and Payout
Your payout in euros at the and of the experiment depends on how much you spend on con-
sumption in total – hence, in all periods.
However, only those consumption expenses increase your payout, which are
higher than 9 tokens!
Consumption expenses, which are below 9 tokens, affect your payout negatively in two ways:
1. Consumption expenses below 9 tokens are NOT considered. If you spend, say 5 tokens,
in any period, then your wealth decreases by 5 tokens, but your payout does not increase.
2. Your total payout at the end of the experiment in tokens will be reduced by
10% for each period in which consumption is below 9 tokens.
Consumption expenses of at least 9 tokens enter your payout positively although with dif-
ferent weights, where the weight depends on the period in which you consume. A weight is
a factor with which consumption in a given period is multiplied. Weights of later periods are














As you can see from the table, consumption in the first period enters your payout with a
weight of 1 – hence, in full. Expenses which are made in e.g. period 6 receive a lower weight of
0.90.
Example: Given your consumption expenses in period 3 amount to 11.5 tokens, then these
expenses increase your payout by 11.5× 0.96 = 11.04 tokens.
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To calculate your payout at the end of the experiment, consumption expenses of any period
– if they are at least 9 tokens – are multiplied by the weight and summed up:
Total Payout (in tokens) = consumption in period 1 × 1.00 + consumption in period 2 × 0.98
+ . . . + consumption in period 12 × 0.78.
From this amount 10% are subtracted for each period you spend less than 9 tokens on
consumption. The resulting amount in tokens is converted in euros with the following exchange
rate:
15 tokens = 1 Euro
Additionally, you receive 4 Euro for your participation regardless of your consumption choices.
Summary “Consumption and Payout” On the one hand high consumption in early pe-
riods is contributing relatively more to your payout.
On the other hand, with lower consumption and the accumulation of savings you are able
to make sufficiently high consumption expenses in case of low net income.
Taxes and Total Tax Burden
In every period a certain amount is subtracted as tax from your gross income. This amount
may vary from period to period. The current tax level for the respective period is displayed on
your screen.
The total tax burden over the 12 periods have to sum up to 72 tokens.
Hence, the average tax per period is given by 6 tokens. If the tax is below or above 6
tokens in any period, then the deviation has to be compensated over the remaining periods.
Example: Suppose you have already paid a 60 tokens as taxes over the first 10 periods, then
12 tokens have to be paid in the course of the remaining 2 periods of the experiment.
Forecasts
At the end of each period you have to provide an estimate concerning your net income for
the remaining periods. Specifically, you have to state whether net income will on average
increase, remain constant, or decrease.
For each correct forecast you will receive an additional token on top of your total payout.
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Operation
To make consumption expenses, please write the amount of tokens you want to spend in the
respective field and click on the “Continue” button. You have 30 seconds time for this task.
You can use (maximally) the first decimal place for your entry. Please note that the comma
“,” has to entered as dot “.”.
You carry out your consumption decision on the Decision Screen. On this screen you also
see a button which symbolizes a calculator. Clicking on the button opens a calculator, which
you are welcome to use.
The decision screen is followed by an overview screen which provides an overview over the
previous periods.
End of the Experiment
After having completed a short questionnaire, participants will be reimbursed individually.
Please bring the receipt and the card indicating your workstation number with you. The payout
will be in private.
Questions of Understanding to Revise the Contents
• What happens concerning your payout if you have made consumption expenses in one
period that amount to 4 tokens?
• How much is the total tax burden that you have to pay over the 12 periods?
• Say consumption in period 6 amounts to x token, with which weight does the amount x
enter your payout?
• Say you still have savings after period 12, do these savings contribute to your payout?
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B Additional Figures
INSERT FIGURE B.1 HERE.
INSERT FIGURE B.2 HERE.
30












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
(b) Initially Sustainable Tax
Notes: The figure shows the prevailing tax in each period for the two different tax regimes we use in the
experiment. In both treatments, total tax revenues sum to 72 units over the course of the treatment.
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Period
(d) Treatment COMMIT
Notes: The figure shows consumption averaged across subjects for each period of the experiment. The consoli-
dation occurs in all treatments in period t = 5. For easy reference we also plot net income (light grey line).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
(d) Treatment COMMIT
Notes: The figure shows consumption averaged across subjects and the reference path. The solid line with dots
is average consumption, and the reference path is represented by the bold dashed line. For easy reference we also
show net income which is the light grey solid line. The consolidation occurs in all treatments in period t = 5.
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Difference in Consumption
(d) Treatment COMMIT
Notes: The figure shows relative frequencies of the change in consumption from period t = 4 to t = 5 (ci5 − ci4).
The vertical line indicates the average contraction response for the respective treatment.
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Period
(d) Treatment COMMIT
Notes: The figure shows savings rates averaged across subjects for each period of the experiment. The consoli-
dation occurs in all treatments in period t = 5.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Beliefs across Periods in SUST












NI increases NI remains at current level
NI decreases
Notes: The figure shows the fractions (in percent) of subjects that believe that net income (NI) will increase,
remain at the current level, or decrease on average compared to the respective period. The consolidation occurs
in period t = 5.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Beliefs across Periods in UNSUST












NI increases NI remains at current level
NI decreases
Notes: The figure shows the fractions (in percent) of subjects that believe that net income (NI) will increase,
remain at the current level, or decrease on average compared to the respective period. The consolidation occurs
in period t = 5.
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Figure 8: Distribution of Beliefs across Periods in TRANSP












NI increases NI remains at current level
NI decreases
Notes: The figure shows the fractions (in percent) of subjects that believe that net income (NI) will increase,
remain at the current level, or decrease on average compared to the respective period. The consolidation occurs
in period t = 5.
38

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
(d) COMMIT and COMMIT-DEBT
Notes: The figure shows consumption averaged across subjects for each period of the experiment. Average con-
sumption in treatments with debt is indicated by the bold black line, average consumption in baseline treatments
with no debt is indicated by the thinner line with dots. For easy reference we also plot net income which is the
light grey line. The consolidation occurs in all treatments in period t = 5.
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average consumption median consumption
Notes: The figure shows consumption averaged across subjects for each period of the experiment (bold line
with dots). Additionally, to provide information about the distribution of consumption, we plot the median
consumption (dashed line) and shade the area between the 10th and the 90th percentile in light grey and the
area between the 25th and the 75th percentile in dark grey. The consolidation occurs in all treatments in period
t = 5.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Period
UNSUST SUST
UNSUST lower threshold SUST lower threshold
Notes: The figure shows consumption averaged across subjects for each period of the experiment for Treatments
SUST (dashed line with diamond symbols), UNSUST (solid line with dot symbols), SUST with the lower threshold
(dot-dashed line with triangle symbols), and UNSUST with the lower threshold (dotted line with square symbols).
The consolidation occurs in all treatments in period t = 5.
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Table 1: Displayed Interpretations of the current fiscal stance
Period Messages (translated from German)
1 Taxes are going to rise during the experiment.
2 This tax-level cannot be sustained until the end of the experiment.
3 With respect to the total amount of tax due, current tax is below average
tax.
4 This tax-level would not be sufficient to pay the amount of taxes due.
5 In the course of the experiment taxes might rise, but they do not have
to rise.
6 This tax-level would be sufficient to pay the amount of taxes due, if it
will be retained.
7 There is no necessity to increase taxes.
8 The current tax level can be sustained.
9 Tax increases are still not necessary.
10 This tax-level would be sufficient to pay the amount of taxes due.
11 The tax level can be sustained.
12 The total amount of tax due is paid off with this last tax payment.
Notes: The messages are only shown in Treatments TRANSP and are identical for each subject.
42
Table 2: Changes in Consumption due to the Consolidation
SUST UNSUST COMMIT TRANSP
Average change: c5 − c4 -8.43 -3.36 5.49 -3.17
Stand. error 0.91 0.55 1.21 0.45
Stand. deviation 5.76 3.48 7.66 2.86
p-values: H0 : c5 − c4 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p-values: pairwise comparisons
vs UNSUST 0.00
vs COMMIT 0.00 0.00
vs TRANSP 0.00 0.56 0.00
Notes: To test whether the consumption response to the contraction is different from 0, we employ a one-sample
t-test. The p-values reported in the last three rows for the pairwise comparisons refer to Mann-Whitney rank-
sum tests. The corresponding null hypothesis is that the consumption responses due to the contraction are equal
among Treatments SUST, UNSUST, TRANSP, and COMMIT.
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Table 3: Pre- and Post-Consolidation Saving
SUST UNSUST COMMIT TRANSP
Savings rate averaged over period 1-4 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.16
Stand. error 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Stand. deviation 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.16
p-values: H0 :
∑4
t=1 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Savings rate averaged over period 5-8 -0.02 -0.24 -0.01
Stand. error 0.02 0.03 0.03
Stand. deviation 0.10 0.18 0.17
p-values: H0 :
∑8
t=5 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.17 0.00 0.61
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 1-4
vs UNSUST 0.00
vs COMMIT 0.00 0.87
vs TRANSP 0.00 0.27 0.21
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 5-8
vs COMMIT 0.00
vs TRANSP 0.52 0.00
Notes: The savings rate is sit/(yt − taxt). To test whether the savings rates averaged across the respective
periods are different from 0, we employ a one-sample t-test. The p-values for the pairwise comparisons refer to
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. The corresponding null hypothesis is that the savings rates averaged across the
respective periods are equal among Treatments SUST, UNSUST, TRANSP, and COMMIT.
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Table 4: Fraction of Belief “Net Income will Decrease”
SUST UNSUST TRANSP
Fraction averaged over period 1-4 0.14 0.68 0.68
Fraction averaged over period 5-8 0.28 0.14
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 1-4
vs UNSUST 0.00
vs TRANSP 0.00 0.97
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 5-8
vs TRANSP 0.03
Notes: The p-values refer to Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. The corresponding null hypothesis is that the fraction
of the beliefs “net income will decrease” averaged across the respective periods are equal among Treatments SUST,
UNSUST, and TRANSP.
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Table 5: Correlation between Beliefs and Changes in Consumption due to the Consolidation
SUST UNSUST TRANSP
Corr(c5 − c4, belief 5) 0.27 0.05 -0.19
p-values: H0 : Corr(c5 − c4, belief 5) = 0 0.10 0.76 0.24
Notes: We show Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. The p-values reported refer to Spearman’s rank
correlation test. The corresponding null hypothesis is that the consumption responses due to the contraction and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Pre- and Post-Consolidation Saving
SUST-DEBT UNSUST-DEBT COMMIT-DEBT TRANSP-DEBT
All subjects
Savings rate averaged over period 1-4 -0.20 -0.03 -0.18 -0.17
Stand. error 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08
Stand. deviation 0.44 0.33 0.48 0.50
p-values: H0 :
∑4
t=1 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.01 0.62 0.02 0.03
Savings rate averaged over period 5-8 0.03 0.14 0.21
Stand. error 0.04 0.07 0.07
Stand. deviation 0.26 0.47 0.42
p-values: H0 :
∑8
t=5 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.42 0.07 0.00
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 1-4
vs UNSUST 0.01
vs COMMIT 0.25 0.27
vs TRANSP 0.08 0.55 0.82
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 5-8
vs COMMIT 0.95
vs TRANSP 0.24 0.35
Subjects with non-negative savings account in t = 5
Savings rate averaged over period 1-4 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.17
Stand. error 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Stand. deviation 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.07
p-values: H0 :
∑4
t=1 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Savings rate averaged over period 5-8 -0.07 -0.14 -0.04
Stand. error 0.03 0.04 0.03
Stand. deviation 0.16 0.17 0.12
p-values: H0 :
∑8
t=5 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.04 0.00 0.11
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 1-4
vs UNSUST 0.06
vs COMMIT 0.02 0.58
vs TRANSP 0.00 0.32 1.00
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 5-8
vs COMMIT 0.11
vs TRANSP 0.94 0.13
Subjects with negative savings account in t = 5
Savings rate averaged over period 1-4 -0.39 -0.35 -0.57 -0.64
Stand. error 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11
Stand. deviation 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.43
p-values: H0 :
∑4
t=1 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Savings rate averaged over period 5-8 0.23 0.55 0.45
Stand. error 0.08 0.11 0.11
Stand. deviation 0.30 0.49 0.45
p-values: H0 :
∑8
t=5 st/(yt − taxt)/4 = 0 0.02 0.00 0.00
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 1-4
vs UNSUST 0.89
vs COMMIT 0.14 0.14
vs TRANSP 0.06 0.05 0.60
p-values: pairwise comparisons Period 5-8
vs COMMIT 0.21
vs TRANSP 0.04 0.48
Notes: The savings rate is sit/(yt − taxt). To test whether the savings rates averaged across the respective
periods are different from 0, we employ a one-sample t-test. The p-values for the pairwise comparisons refer to
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests. The corresponding null hypothesis is that the savings rates averaged across the
respective periods are equal among Treatments SUST-DEBT, UNSUST-DEBT, TRANSP-DEBT, and COMMIT-
DEBT. Because the contraction is followed by a tax reduction in SUST-DEBT, the comparison of outcomes in
the post-consolidation periods is impaired. Therefore we do not calculate the average savings rate for Treatment
SUST-DEBT after the contraction. We have 24 subjects with negative savings accounts in t = 5 in Treatment
SUST-DEBT, 14 in UNSUST-DEBT, 19 in COMMIT-DEBT, and 17 in TRANSP-DEBT.
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